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Abstract 
The issue of frauds through payment cards has received a great deal of attention from 
authorities. A large share of card frauds can be ascribed to the phenomenon of 
counterfeiting of debit cards, widely used payment instrument in “face-to-face” transactions. 
With the advent of the Single Euro Payment Area, the European banking community has 
shared and almost reached the ambitious goal of replacing all the cards (and accepting 
terminals) with chip compatible ones, which are supposed to be harder to clone than the 
magnetic stripe card. Using a bi-annual balanced panel data of over one hundred Italian 
banks, in this paper we estimate for the first time the real impact on card frauds caused by 
the chip card migration. The results confirm the positive effects of the new technology: the 
ratio between fraud and ATM-POS transactions (card fraud loss rate) is reduced 
significantly if the chip card is present.  
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1. Introduction 
The confidence in the means of payment is a public good whose production requires 
investments in technology. From this point of view, the card fraud represents a serious 
threat to the functioning of one of the most used payment networks also in the transactions 
carried out abroad. According to the estimates the fraudulent transactions carried out in 
Europe on POS and ATM in a year amount to over 1 billion euros; similar figures are 
recorded in the United States. Much of this amount is used to finance other illegal activities, 
including international terrorism (Shen et. al. 2007). 
The prevention and reduction of risks in the usage of electronic payment instruments 
are crucial for the integration and integrity of retail payment systems in Europe. The 
adoption of common security standards, in fact, together with the exchange of information 
and the financial education, represents one of the fundamental pillars for the prevention, the 
reduction of the social costs due to frauds and the development of secure electronic 
payments. 
The success achieved in the adoption of new preventive technologies represents a 
strong incentive for the market operators to continue in the path of modernization. The 
savings arising from the technological innovation, even when they are not properly 
perceived by the players of change (typical so called "free riding" problems) are then felt by 
everyone, banks and consumers. 
The adoption of the “microchip” in the countries involved in the creation of the SEPA 
- Single Euro Payments Area - is an example of how the strategy of cooperation - under the 
aegis of the authorities, primarily the central banks - could produce positive results. At the 
end of 2011, in fact, about 90 per cent of the cards and the accepting terminals (POS, ATM) 
in Europe (70 per cent in Italy), have migrated to the so-called “EMV” microchip 
technology, developed by Visa Europay-Mastercard already since 1999 and endorsed by the 
European banking community in view of SEPA. This technology - with respect to the old 
"magnetic stripe" - makes it more expensive for the fraudster to duplicate the card and, 
above all, capture sensitive data contained in the microchip.  
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Ten years ago, with the advent of the euro, the rates of migration to chip in Europe 
were a tenth of the present ones; in Italy virtually nil. With reference to the physical 
terminals1, the fears of fraud have recently been directed to countries outside the EU. 
Among these, the United States, which still allow a widespread use of the magnetic stripe 
technology, stand out. This technology is still combined with the micro-chip of the cards 
issued in Europe in order to preserve the fundamental principle of full reachability of the 
payment instruments. 
Recently, the "chip only" based solutions have been under scrutiny within the 
Eurosystem, with cards issued without magnetic stripe and with limited possibilities of use 
outside of the chip-EMV networks (European Central Bank, 2010). These are more incisive 
solutions to the problem of the illegal card usages which in the face-to-face transactions 
concern above all the counterfeit cards used in zones or areas where the "magnetic stripe" is 
still prevalent (ECB 2011, VII Sepa Report). The 'liability shift rules', issued by the 
governance authorities of the card payment schemes, which allow to transfer the fraud 
losses towards the unsafe operators, have given decisive impetus to the European migration. 
Nevertheless, such rules are not applicable outside in the other contexts. In the countries 
outside the EU, in fact, the self-regulation bodies – even though in the context of common 
cards and marks (for example Visa and Mastercard) - pursue different strategies in the 
protection of the interests of the local bank communities. 
The Italian banks, after the initial uncertainties, have accelerated the replacement of 
cards and terminals with "chip compliant" devices, especially since 2006, when the rate of 
card fraud (fraud losses out of total operations) has reached the maximum point (Bank of 
Italy, Report on the 2009). 
The debate is still in progress between the opposing positions of the European banking 
community, which supports the generalized shift towards the chip, and the United States 
where only recently a serious debate has been launched on the issue so partly overcoming 
the resistance of those who are not convinced, given the migration costs, that the chip 
represents an effective solution to the problem of the asymmetries in the security provisions 
                                                          
1
  This work does not consider the fraudulent activities carried out using cards in the ”virtual” world (so-
called "card not present" frauds). 
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both at national level and at cross-border level. In fact there are no rigorous empirical 
studies, aimed at demonstrating the effective benefits induced by the micro-chip technology 
in the reduction of the card fraud. 
The objective of this study is therefore to verify empirically the impact of the 
microchip cards on the frauds, taking into account the Italian case study. In Section 2 a brief 
review of the available literature on the subject is exposed. In Sections 3 and 4 we show in 
more detail the problem of the card fraud and the database used in this work. The Section 5 
illustrates the model of analysis and the econometric approach, aimed to verify the 
relationship between microchips and debit card frauds. The results are discussed in Section 
6, while the conclusions and some policy indications are reported in Section 7. 
 
2. Literature 
The theoretical and empirical literature has addressed the issue of the opportunistic 
and illegal behaviours in several economic and financial sectors (insurance, accounting, 
finance). Nevertheless the analyses of the links between fraudulent utilizations and payment 
technologies are scarce. The analytical approaches to the issue of the fraud in the payments 
system are essentially twofold. The fraudulent phenomena are evaluated either in terms of 
their impact on the demand for electronic means of payments, or of their effects on the risk 
management models. 
In the first approach the fraud is an explanatory variable in a micro-founded payment 
instruments demand equation. The purpose is essentially to evaluate the consumer 
behaviour during the choice of secure payment instruments. Kosse (2010) demonstrates for 
example that the fraud significantly reduces the use of payment cards both in the POS, and 
in the ATM2. These works do not deal, however, with the issue of the determinants of the 
fraud. 
In the second approach, instead, the fraud assumes the role of dependent variable. The 
fraudulent event is in fact the random variable which the analyst has to interpret on the basis 
                                                          
2
 The negative impact of the fraud on the use of payment cards is also confirmed in a recent work that for 
the first time utilizes macro-territorial data for Italy (see Ardizzi and Iachini, 2012). 
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of a probabilistic model. The probabilistic fraud function can be estimated through various 
quantitative methods (logistic or neural models, Bayesian approaches, actuarial models). In 
this context, the analyst's goal is essentially to calculate the probability that a given tool can 
be used fraudulently (Shen et al., 2007, Paulina and Paba, 2010). At the same time, once 
identified the probabilistic model of the fraud, the risk manager's goal is to make prevention, 
intercept anomalies and reduce the risk of losses for the bank (Caimi et al., 2006). 
Among the econometric techniques most used for the detection of the risk of fraud 
there is the binomial logistic regression (Shen et al., 2007) based on high-frequency time 
series of micro-data, where the dependent variable takes the value 1 when an irregular event 
occurs (es. theft, loss, cloning) and 0 in all other cases3. Among the explanatory variables of 
the equation, a series of covariates that identify the type of instrument (e.g. debit card), the 
type of technology (e.g. chip card), the brand (e.g. Visa) and "individual specific" 
characteristics of the card holder (e.g. expenditure ceilings, age, income, residence, and so 
on) can therefore be inserted. This type of analysis requires a considerable amount of 
confidential information, available only in the protected archives of the anti-fraud offices of 
the companies who either issue or manage payment cards. 
However, the regression techniques used by the risk management analysts provide 
useful insights for applications addressed to the policy maker, taking into consideration 
bank-level data sets and non-categorical fraud risk indicators. 
 
3. Payment card frauds  
The analysts distinguish between "gross fraud" and "net fraud" (Caimi et al., 2006). 
The "gross fraud" is the total amount of transactions disclaimed by the cardholder (also 
automatically through card blocking or alert systems) in front of an impairement of the card 
and of the sensitive information. This one is typically measured, then, from the “issuing” 
side of the card4 (so-called "issuing fraud").  
                                                          
3
 The most complex models consider multinomial categorical variables, with reference to specific events: 
theft, loss, interception of the card, etc. 
4
 When the irregular transaction is detected, on the contrary, on the side of the operator who accepts the 
card, we talk about "acquiring fraud". In this paper we do not consider this possibility, since the information 
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The impairment of the card for fraudulent purposes can be traced back to several 
causes: theft, loss, cloning, non-receipt, etc. The gross fraud represents the potential loss for 
the circuit, and does not take its actual economic impact (loss) on the intermediary and on 
its capital into account. The "net fraud " is instead the accounting loss recorded on the 
balance sheet by the acquirer or the issuer due to the occurrence of the gross fraud. The 
incidence of the gross fraud on the net one depends on the mechanisms of transfer of 
responsibility (liability shift) between the various parties involved (issuer, acquirer, owner, 
operator). 
In this paper we consider the amount of the "gross" fraud, divided by the gross amount 
of the total card transactions (the so-called card fraud loss rate) as a synthetic indicator of 
riskiness of the instrument. We moreover consider only the fraudulent uses as a result of 
card counterfeiting or cloning, namely the interception of sensitive data and the duplication 
of the physical supports for illicit purposes unknown to the legitimate cardholder. This is the 
fraud case which has involved the transition to the microcircuit technology so as to oppose 
its effects. Compared to the magnetic stripe, the "chip" enables in fact both the direct and 
the protected on-line dialogue (encryption) between the card and the acceptance device 
(ATM or POS) in the preliminary phase of authentication of the cardholder, and the 
encrypted storage of the sensitive data once the transaction has been completed. 
Cloning is still the main source of card fraud. It is perpetrated by means of 
"skimming" devices which allow fraudsters to decode the data contained in the magnetic 
stripe card (e.g  holder’s name, card number, etc.) in order to use them in devices duplicated 
through ATM and POS. Excluding the frauds carried out without the presence of the 
physical card (the so-called "card not present" fraud, for example via Internet, telephone or 
mail), the cloning represent in fact about 70 per cent of the whole set of card frauds (Central 
Office for Means of Payment Fraud-UCAMP Report 20105). The debit cards record lower 
levels of fraud (about 1/5) than those on average experienced on the credit cards, above all 
at the domestic level, thanks also to the combination of the PIN code on ATM and POS 
(Bank of Italy, 2009). However, the issue of the frauds committed through counterfeit cards 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
available on the "acquiring side" are difficult to distinguish by type of card (debit, credit or prepaid card) or 
channel (Internet, physical). 
5
 The Report contains also an illustration of the different types of fraud and of the underlying mechanisms. 
 7 
 
used in systems that do not adopt the chip technology has arisen during the last few years 
even for the debit cards6 (e.g., ATM, Maestro, Visa Electron circuits). 
This study focuses therefore on the debit cards, which are mainly used in the physical 
world. The credit card, besides not requiring the compulsory matching of the PIN code 
when the operation takes place, is also used in the “distance” transactions, such as the 
Internet or telephone ones. This instrument presents, therefore, an area of risk which is more 
extensive in term of security provisions and necessarily different compared to the debit card 
(Sahin and Duman, 2011). Furthermore, the higher concentration in the credit card market 
strongly reduces the statistical numerosity of the information available about the debit card, 
issued by nearly all Italian banks and more popular among households (Bank of Italy, 
Survey on Household Income and Wealth,  2010). 
Since 2009, after the constitution (Act 166/2005) of the antifraud system at the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance-Central Office for Means of Payment Fraud (UCAMP), 
people can rely on the publication of a report on card frauds in Italy, which provides a great 
deal of systemic level information relative to the size and the dynamics of the frauds with 
respect to the different types of instrument or channel (debit card, credit, internet, etc.) and 
underlying causes (cloning, theft, loss, etc.). According to the report, in the biennium 2009-
2010 (the latest data available), the credit card fraud losses, divided by the total amount of 
POS and ATM transactions, have decreased by 11 per cent (UCAMP Report 2010). Those 
related to the cloning have decreased by 27 per cent. In the biennium in question, the 
percentage of microchip cards increases by 10 percent points, going from 60 to 70 percent 
(ECB 2011). Since 2007, in parallel with an acceleration of the migration to EMV chip 
required by SEPA, the (credit and debit) card fraud rate indicates a downward trend, 
decreasing from 0.07 per cent (as a share of the level of POS transactions) to 0.05 per cent 
in 2010 (Bank of Italy, Annual Report 2010). 
Similar trends can be inferred even at international level, despite the data relative to 
the phenomenon of fraud available are subdued. Combining the information released by the 
East (the European ATM Security Team) on fraud via ATMs and those published by the 
                                                          
6
 In the case of the debit cards the proportion of the frauds attributable to the clonings is higher (80%) than 
that relative to the credit cards (60%). 
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ECB on the percentages of the compliant chip cards in Europe, an inverse relationship can 
be inferred: as the proportion of  microchip cards increase the rate of fraud decreases7 
(Figure 1). 
 
4. Dataset  
In this work we use data drawn from the reports of the intermediaries on the payment 
services collected by the Bank of Italy from each reporting body (bank or financial 
company) on an aggregate and anonymous basis, available since 2009. The available 
information allow us to construct a longitudinal database for the years 2009 and 2010, 
which includes 108 intermediaries representative of over the 60 per cent of the debit cards 
market. We have excluded the banks that have missing values8 as well as those who do not 
report all the relevant data (e.g frauds, transactions, number of cards issued) in both 
reference periods. This in order to obtain a strictly balanced panel dataset.  
The panel data for the two years under consideration show a decreasing change in the 
rate of fraud on debit cards - calculated as the ratio between the amount of the gross frauds 
and the total amount of the transactions processed by the card issuer - in line with the whole 
banking system (Table 1) as reported by the Central Office for Means of Payment Fraud-
UCAMP9 (2011). 
The Figure 2 shows instead the aggregate banking statistics available at the Bank of 
Italy (but not for individual banks) on the fraud rates relative to the transactions and the 
share of the migrations to the chip debit cards occurred in Italy between 2003 and 2010; it 
also shows a sharp increase in the fraudulent transactions in 2006, caused mainly by the 
                                                          
7
 On this point see also CapGemini, World Payment 2011. 
8
 If we consider also the banks which do not report frauds data (missing), conventionally setting them equal 
to zero, we run the risk of underestimation of the phenomenon and of selecting intermediaries with a fraud risk 
equal to zero not in a random way. 
9
 In particular, the UCAMP archive collects personal daily data from the single intermediaries (banks, 
companies issuing credit cards on the basis of information directly coming from the anti-fraud offices of the 
companies. These information are shared between the reporting institutions for preventive reasons, according 
to the provisions of the law. The statistics used in the present work, instead, concern semi-annual or annual 
information, aggregated and signalled by the banks to the Bank of Italy with the aim to provide the 
information concerning the pattern of the phenomenon. 
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intensification of the cloning, followed by a gradual reduction occurred in parallel with an 
acceleration of the migration to the chip. 
 
5. Model of analysis 
In the literature review we have shown that in the approach adopted by the sector 
analysts  in the study of the card fraud for forecasting purposes it is related to a set of 
explanatory variables within regression models for categorical data (eg, logit, probit 
models). The relationship is expressed according to a function like this: 
                    yi = f (x1 .... xn) 
Where y is the target variable for the instrument of payment i, generally expressed as a 
binomial function. The variables that instead affect the probability of occurrence of the 
fraud (Caimi et al., 2006) and which represent the arguments (regressors) of the function, 
consider the number and type of (e.g., credit or debit) cards used, the presence of chip on the 
card, the type of control over the shipping and activation process of the same, the maximum 
utilization limit granted to the customer, the licensing and warning systems  (e.g. sms alert), 
an so on. 
On the ground of the available data (aggregated to the bank level), you may consider 
only some of the variables listed above. In particular, the variables available (counted from 
the side of the issuing bank) are: 
- Total number of cards in circulation issued by the reporting institution 
- Number of cards with the chip 
- Amount of POS transactions and ATM withdrawals through cards issued by the 
reporting institution 
- Amount of transactions carried out through cards issued by the reporting institution 
at its own acceptance points (so called “on-us transactions”) 
- Amount of disclaimed transactions in the case of operations carried out with cards 
issued by the reporting institution (issuing fraud). 
The equation of the model of analysis of the fraud is therefore as follows:  
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 FRAUD = α0 + β1CHIP + ΣjβjZj + uit     [1] 
 con j=2…n  
 
The dependent variable (FRAUD) is equal to the ratio of operations disclaimed by the 
holder (gross fraud) to total transactions (POS and ATM), that is the card fraud loss rate. As 
the rate of fraud increases, the potential loss and hence the riskness borne by the cards 
issued by the reporting bank increases. This variable does not follow a dichotomous 
distribution such as in the logistic models, nevertheless it is distributed continuously in the 
range [0-1] with a concentrated mass of (positive) values close to zero. Figure 3 shows the 
empirical distribution of the variable FRAUD calculated from data provided by the Italian 
banks and pooled for the biennium 2009-2010. Figure 4 shows instead the density function 
of the same, logarithmically transformed, data, from which a log-normal empirical 
distribution can be inferred. 
The first variable in the right-hand side of equation [1] is equal to the percentage of 
microchip cards (CHIP). Its coefficient, expected to be negative, aims to capture the effect 
of the technology believed to be safer on the rate of fraud. This variable is considered 
exogenous to the model, as the choice to adopt chip cards has been driven by the European 
Payments Council (EPC, the self-regulatory body of European banks) and the banks are 
committed to migrate all SEPA cards and terminals to chip EMV standards by the end of 
201010. 
The summation term among the covariates indicates the set of environmental variables 
(Zj), and of the relative coefficients, which can influence the indicator of fraud. One of the 
control variables used in the context of the risk management systems (Caimi et al., 2006) 
identifies the so-called “on-us” operativeness component (ONUS), equal to the percentage 
of transactions that are completed at POS and ATM terminals owned by the same bank that 
issued the card. Therefore, we consider Z1 = ONUS. Even the expected effect of this 
variable on the fraud rate is negative: the higher the share of transactions within its own 
                                                          
10
  The EPC's SEPA Cards Framework (SCF) recognises the EMV standard for SEPA-wide acceptance of 
payments with cards at very high levels of security (European Payments Council, 2009). 
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network is, the lower the information asymmetries are and the higher the ability of the 
intermediary to prevent the frauds promptly would be (Giacomelli, 2008). 
The data (Fig. 5) actually show a lower incidence of the "on-us" rate of fraud 
compared to the overall fraud rate. 
A second control variable (Z2 = QCARTE) is included to take into account the 
relative size of the intermediary, expressed as a percentage of the cards issued compared to 
the overall number of cards in circulation or to the intermediated transactions. The effect on 
the indicator of fraud can be ambiguous: on the one hand the larger diffusion of the 
instrument may increase the probability for the bank of having a counterfeited card (positive 
coefficient); on the other hand, the bank can better diversify the risk (negative coefficient) 
by extending its market share. 
Finally, in the longitudinal models the term uit in the equation [1] can be decomposed 
into an individual specific effect, a temporal effect and a stochastic disturbance. In 
particular, the individual specific effect incorporates the unobservable elements11  of "firm 
specific" heterogeneity, reducing the omitted variable bias in the estimates. The temporal 
specific effect can be captured by providing, instead, a year dummy. 
 
6. Estimation of the model 
The parameters of the equation [1] were estimated using the balanced panel of 108 
intermediaries observed in 2009 and 2010. The dependent variable (FRAUD), i.e, the rate of 
fraud. is expressed in terms of logarithms (lnFRAUD), in order to reduce the dispersion and 
the asymmetry. The explanatory variables, instead, are expressed in percentage terms and 
are: 
a. the percentage of CHIP cards 
b. the percentage of on-us transaction (onus) 
d. the market share (%) of the cards issued (QCARTE) 
                                                          
11
  These elements may for example be linked to the internal control and risk management system, to the 
type of customer, etc. See Giacomelli, 2008 
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Table 2 describes both the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix for the 
above-mentioned variables, from which the presence of collinearities strong enough to 
endanger the consistency of the estimates does not seem to arise. 
First of all, we estimate the “basic” log-linear model12 which considers only CHIP 
among the covariates, then we include the control variables and test the stability of the 
results with respect to disturbances affecting the initial model. In all cases a time dummy 
variable has been included. 
We have used a panel model with "random effects". The Hausman test strongly rejects 
in fact the hypothesis of 'fixed effects'13, while the Breusch-Pagan test refuses that of 
"poolability" (cross-sectional model instead of panel model). 
6.1.  Results 
The results of the estimates are shown in Table 3. Since the dependent variable is 
logarithmic, the regression coefficients β must be interpreted as meaning that a one unit 
change in the regressor X (expressed as a percentage) is associated with a percentage 
change in Y exactly equal to β . 
As expected, the coefficient of the degree of migration to chip cards (CHIP) has a 
negative and significant sign. The magnitude of the effect, moreover, is significant: an 
increase of ten (percentage) points of the number of chip-compliant cards is associated with 
a reduction in the rate of fraud in the order of 6/7 per cent14.  
                                                          
12
  The log-linear models are usually applied in the presence of dichotomous explanatory variables. In this 
case, the independent variables are all continuous but fall within the range [0-1], being expressed in percentage 
terms. 
13
 The lower accuracy of the "fixed effect" estimator, which considers time-invariant individual 
characteristics, moreover, is also detected when the "within" (intra-group) variability is dominated by the 
"between" (inter-group) variability, see Cameron and Trivedi 2005. This is exactly the case under 
consideration (see Table 2). In addition, we have conducted the J-test for overidentifying restrictions (fixed vs. 
random effects), which is also  robust to heteroschedasticity: also in this case the fixed effect model is rejected. 
14
  Based on the estimated coefficient, ceteris paribus, EMV technology would have resulted in fewer debit 
card fraud losses for about 35 million euro from 2006 (the year of the pick of frauds) to 2010, freeing potential 
resources to continue to innovate in prevention.  
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The incidence of the ONUS transactions turns out to be not significant15, instead; 
however, the market share (QCARTE) shows a significant negative impact on the rate of 
fraud. Nevertheless, this variable may also be a proxy of the probability that the 
intermediary intercepts at its own points of acceptance its own issued cards and of the 
ability of the intermediary to diversify the risk and reduce the potential loss. This effect 
partly offsets the low significance of the estimated coefficient for the variable “ONUS” 
This is true even if we replicate the regression exercise within the ambit of 
homogeneous circuits, that is distinguishing between domestic fraud rate (card issued and 
used in Italy) and cross-border fraud rate (usage abroad). The results are reported in Table 
416. 
6.2. Robustness checks 
We conducted robustness checks of the outcomes illustrated in the previous 
paragraph, using alternative estimation methods that control for the presence of: 1) 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of the residual terms; 2) non-normal distribution of 
the variables, 3) simultaneous causality. Each of the above-named points highlights a 
violation of the assumptions underlying the regression models and can make the results 
inconsistent. 
The method used to control the first distortion factor (1-PCSE) considers an OLS 
estimator of the parameters which nevertheless allows to take into account the possible 
autocorrelation within the panel and the contemporaneous heteroscedasticity of the residual 
terms17. 
                                                          
15
  The variables representative of the acceptance infrastructure of the cards (ATM, POS, chip-compliant 
devices) located in the same seat of the issuing intermediary have not turned out to be significant on the 
contrary. This is consistent with the approach followed which just carries out a census of the phenomenon 
from the perspective of the issuer of the card and not from the perspective of the intermediary who manages 
the POS or the ATM terminal (acquirer). For the sake of brevity we do not present these estimations. 
16
 The estimations are in this case carried out on the unbalanced panel, since the breakdown between Italy 
and foreign countries entails a loss of statistical information and of sample numerosity in the considered 
period. 
17
 Beck and Katz (1995) suggest this approach, of the so-called OLS panel-corrected standard error PCSE 
model, with OLS estimators, preferring it to the "generalised least square" (GLS) generalized model, which 
instead requires T> n. On this point see also Hoechle (2007) and Podestà (2002). We apply also a random 
effects panel model that admits the presence of "clustered standard errors" that is of errors correlated 
"between" (per unity of the panel) and robust against heteroskedasticity. This method does not control also for, 
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In addition, we also consider a so called “quantile” regression estimator (2-quantile 
method) where the relationship between y and x is not expressed by the variation of the 
conditional mean of y given x (classical linear model), but by the variation of one of its 
quantiles (e.g. median). This approach is useful in the presence of non-normal distributions 
of the dependent variable, or of high statistical dispersion, which may make the mean value 
less significant. Furthermore, it may be interesting to calculate the impact of the chip on the 
median fraud rates of the distribution computed at the level of the riskier intermediaries (i.e. 
75th percentile). For this method we have also resorted to the non-parametric bootstrap to 
calculate the standard errors and test the significance of the estimated coefficients without 
necessarily making assumptions about the probabilistic model and the reference distribution 
of the sample. The results reported in Table 5 consider the regression on the median value 
and on the 75th percentile of the dependent variable18. 
The third factor of distortion (simultaneous causality) is the possibility that the 
relationship between the rate of fraud and chip cards is bi-directional. For example, the 
trend of the rate of fraud in the period can also accelerate the choice of the bank to migrate 
to the chip card. Hence, also an OLS regression (3-OLSlag method) of the rate of fraud 
(always expressed in logarithmic form) on the one year lagged values of the CHIP variable 
has been taken into account. Such solution should reduce this problem19: the rate of fraud 
reported in the year t can be influenced by the migration rate in the period t-1, whereas the 
opposite is not logically true.  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
however, the contemporaneous presence of serial and cross sectional correlation. The estimated coefficients 
for the variable CHIP are however always significant and comparable in intensity with each other; also the 
results of these estimations are available in Appendix (Tables 5 and 6). 
18
 The estimation for quantiles is conducted on the "pooled" panel, in order to gain degrees of freedom. The 
quantile regression applied to panel models in fact requires a high sample size to unbundle the unobservable 
individual specific effects and produce consistent estimates (see Koenker, 2004). 
19
 The general approach to follow for dealing with the problem of the simultaneous causality or 
endogeneity of the regressors is the one of the regression with instrumental variables. However, in this case 
there are no instrumental variables that simultaneously satisfy the requirements of relevance and of exogeneity 
available (see Cameron and Trivedi, 2005) 
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The Table 5 shows a comparison between the different estimators, applied to the basic 
model20, which includes the impact of the chip and the time dummy among the explanatory 
variables:: 
lnFRAUD = α0 + β1CHIP + β2 d_anno                                                             [2] 
The basic model has proved to be sufficiently robust to perturbations of the same (see 
par. 6.1), has the advantage of parsimony in the parameters to be estimated. 
The robustness checks seem to be more than satisfactory. In all the methods adopted 
the significance and the intensity of the CHIP effect on the rate of fraud (lnFRAUD) is 
confirmed. The magnitude of such effect is higher in the regression estimated with the 75th 
percentile method, compared to that estimated on the 50th (median), suggesting that the 
benefits derived from the micro chip are most evident in the presence of high rates of 
fraud21. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The issue of the frauds through payment cards is the focus of growing attention, 
especially after the initiation of the Single Euro Payments Area - SEPA. The phenomena of 
cloning and counterfeiting significantly affect the segment of the debit cards (eg ATM), 
where some asymmetries in the field of the security systems both between banks and 
between domestic and international systems are exploited. Among these asymmetries the 
non uniform migration of the card schemes to the micro-chip technology, especially in 
countries outside the Eurosystem, stands out. In this work an empirical exercise aimed at 
assessing the benefits arising from the microchip cards in terms of reduction of the rate of 
                                                          
20
 The results relative to the whole model obtained through the different estimation methods are reported in 
Table 6. 
21
 Final tests concerns the robustness of the results obtained even apart from the log normal model, 
considering the absolute values of the rate of fraud as the dependent variable (FRAUD). We use a Tobit 
regression model: unlike the standard panel regression with individual random effects, this model can 
accommodate the particular distribution of the dependent variable, which is censored (non negative) and has a 
concentrated mass of positive values very close to zero. The results confirm the significance of the coefficient 
(negative) the degree of migration to the chip on the rate of fraud. Moreover, all results are robust aggregating 
the information of the intermediaries who belong to the same banking group, in order to control for possible 
"group” specific effects. For the sake of brevity, we do not present the results of these tests, available on 
request from the author. 
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fraud in Italy has been for the first time carried out. The results confirm the positive effects 
of the new prevention technology: faced with an increase of 10 percentage points (in 
absolute terms) in the cards migrated to the chip, the ratio of frauds to transactions is 
reduced by 6/7 per cent, on average. That would implies in Italy since 2006, the year in 
which the frauds reached their maximum peak, the chip technology has resulted in a fall in 
the losses arising from frauds of several tens of millions of euros on the transactions carried 
out through ATM and POS with payment cards, freeing potential resources that can be 
devoted to the prevention innovations. 
It is therefore necessary to strengthen the international commitments aimed at promoting 
the widest possible adherence to the new technology standards, planning also the so-called 
"chip only" option, opportunely accompanied by (incentivating) rules on the transfer of 
responsibility so as to support the more reliable operators22 (so called “liability shift rules”). 
                                                          
22
 See the considerations of the Eurosystem in the seventh Report (2010) on the state of the art of the Single 
Euro Payment Area (SEPA), p. 7. 
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Tables and Figures 
             
 
Figure 1: Pattern of the fraud rate (issuing side) and % of EMV cards in Europe (issuing 
side) and % of EMV cards in Europe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Source: EAST, ECB 
 
 
 
Table 1: Card fraud (clonation):  
 
Description Panel  Total Italy (1) 
Fraud rate (clonation): year 2010 0.016% 0.015% 
% change 2009-2010 -22.79% -17.14% 
 
(1) – Source: Ministery of Treasure, Antifraud Office 
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Table 2: Panel dataset - descriptive statistics 
 
Variable   Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
lnFRAUD overall -8.956 1.405 -16.367 -5.492 N =     216 
 between  1.192 -13.357 -6.227 n =     108 
 within  0.748 -11.966 -5.946 T =       2 
       
CHIP overall 0.684 0.320 0.000 1.000 N =     216 
 between  0.284 0.000 1.000 n =     108 
 within  0.150 0.184 1.184 T =       2 
       
ONUS overall 0.113 0.138 0.000 0.943 N =     216 
 between  0.120 0.001 0.836 n =     108 
 within  0.068 -0.163 0.389 T =       2 
       
QCARTE overall 0.005 0.022 0.000 0.175 N =     216 
 between  0.021 0.000 0.174 n =     108 
 within  0.003 -0.026 0.035 T =       2 
       
FRAUD overall 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 N =     216 
 between  0.000 0.000 0.003 n =     108 
 within  0.000 -0.001 0.002 T =       2 
 
Correlation matrix 
        
Variable CHIP ONUS QCARTE 
CHIP 1   
ONUS -0.103 1  
QCARTE 0.066 0.150 1 
 
 
Dependent variable: lnFRAUD 
 
Source: Bank of Italy, banking 
statistics 
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Figure 2: Rate of fraud and chip-EMV indicator in Italy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Empirical distribution (number of banks) rate of fraud on debit cards 
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Figure 4: Empirical distribution (number of banks) of the log - fraud rate  
 
 
 
Figure 5: “Onus” card fraud rate vs total card fraud rate 
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Table 3: Estimation of the log-linear equation model 1 and 2; panel random effect (balanced 
panel) 
 
Regressor  
Random Effect 
Base 
Random Effect 
Full 
CHIP -0.665*** -0.641*** 
 (-0.265) (-0.266) 
d_anno 0.292** 0.309* 
 (0.149) (0.157) 
ONUS  0.271 
               (0.780) 
QCARTE   -15.319* 
  (8.281) 
Constant  -594.93*** -629.8 
  (300.53) (317.22) 
Observations 216 216 
Groups 108 108 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Estimation of the log-linear equation model with cross-border or domestic frauds as 
dependent variable (unbalanced panel) 
 
Regressor  
Cross-
border fraud 
rate (log) 
Domestic fraud 
rate (log) 
   
CHIP -0.692* -0.702*** 
              (0.412) (0.2514) 
d_anno -0.018 0.151 
              (0.208) (0.120) 
ONUS 1.042 0.130 
              (0.670) (-0.565) 
QCARTE -13.573* -10.828 
              (7.204) (9.218) 
Constant 26.540 -310 
  (419.581) (-241.421) 
Observations 201 336 
Groups 108 108 
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Table 5:  Robustness checks against violations of the linear regression assumptions  
               (base model)   
 
Regressori  1-PCSE 2-QUANTILE 3-OLS_lag  
    50° percentile 75° percentile   
CHIP -0.622*** -0.418** -0.831*  
 (-0.078) (-0.211) (-0.487)  
CHIPt-1    -0.920** 
    (0.418) 
d_anno 0.296*** -0.233 0.292  
 (0.067) (0.206) (0.051)  
Constant  -604.0*** -476.19 -254.78  -8.512** 
  (133.85) (369.10) (327.61) (0.266) 
Observations 216 364 364 165 
Groups 108 108 108 . 
 
 
Table 6:  Robustness checks against violations of the linear regression assumptions  
              (all variables) 
    
Regressore    PCSE      re cluster     q50          q90          OLS_lag     
CHIP        -0.647***    -0.641**     -0.433*      -0.726**               
  
            ((0.197)     (0.268)      (0.2271)     (0.3037)                 
 
     
chip t-1                                                         -0.885**  
    
                                                 (-0.4113)                                                                                   
 
anno         0.303***      0.309*                                                 
            (0.038)        (0.163)                                               
 
     
QCARTE       -14.75**     -15.32*      -15.47*      -0.121       -5.683    
             (3.917)      (8.197)      (8.275)      (9.979)      (5.806)    
 
     
ONUS         0.125        0.271        0.0610      -0.0391       -1.138*   
            (0.299)      (0.848)      (0.8405)     (0.6391)     (0.6174)    
 
     
costante     -616.6       -629.8***    -8.540***    -6.822***    -8.385*** 
             (75.928)     (326.831)     (0.175)     (0.218)      (0.278)    
Observations    206          216          331          331          165  
Groups          108          108           .            .            . 
 
Standard errors in parentheses:  p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Legend: PCSE= panel corrected standard errors regression (balanced data); re cluster = random effect 
panel with robust cluster standard errors (balanced data); q50 e q90=quantile (pooled) regression (50° e 90° 
percentile); OLS_lag=ordinary least square   regression with lagged control variable (chip t-1). 
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